President Trump’s attempts to placate Turkish strongman Tayyip Recep Erdogan are consistent with the reigning dogma in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, which holds that Turkey is a counterweight to Iran’s ambitions in the Levant. The Hudson Institute’s Michael Doran articulated this perspective admirably in a recent essay at Mosaic Magazine. He wrote: “America needs to back up its allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and potentially Turkey), and isolate its adversaries (Iran, Russia, China, Islamic State). Everything else is secondary….The ‘big-time’ point is this: an ally is a state that supports the American security system. Two questions should thus decide whether America treats a state as a friend or as a foe. Will the state actively help to defend that system against those—Russia, China, and Iran—who seek to weaken or destroy it? If it won’t take action, will it at least deny its territory and resources to America’s enemies?”
The trouble is that Russia and China already have their claws so deeply into Turkey that the usual sort of concessions to Turkey won’t do any good. As I warned a year ago, China will buy Turkey on the cheap. A billion-dollar swap line from China (and additional unpublicized financing) saved the Turkish lira from free fall last June. With $1.3 trillion in net foreign assets, China can afford to prop up the debt-ridden, mismanaged Turkish economy as it takes over logistics, broadband, and other strategic sectors.
President Trump and Treasury Secretary Mnuchin warned last week that they could shut down the Turkish economy. Strictly speaking, that is true: the U.S. could deny Turkish banks access to dollar payments, which would immediately destroy the value of Turkey’s $300 billion of external debt. That would push European banks over the edge and probably push the world into recession. I doubt the U.S. will take such an extreme measure. Otherwise, Turkey can survive milder U.S. sanctions with Chinese help.
Notoriously, Turkey has purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system, and has been punished with the suspension of sales of America’s F-35 fighter. Washington is largely at fault here. The competitor to the S-400, the American Patriot system, is an antiquated, expensive, and ineffective system by comparison to the S-400, and would have been replaced long ago except for the persuasiveness of the lobbyists of Raytheon, which makes the Patriot. Remarkably, America’s secretary of defense is a former Raytheon lobbyist. Turkey doesn’t really need a long-range stealth penetrator like the F-35; it can do quite well with Russia’s cheaper 4th-generation (non-stealth) fighters.
I have been warning about the emergence of a Chinese sphere of influence in the Middle East — a “Pax Sinica” — since 2013. This has been creeping up on us, and Washington ignored it. Now there is a firm Sino-Russian alliance, as Emil Avdalianiwrote recently in a paper for the Begin-Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University.
The strategic calculus has become far more complex, and the simplistic approach advocated by various of my friends simply will not work. The key lesson in all of this is that the United States should stop thinking like the world’s only hyperpower, which we were twenty years ago, before we dumbed it all away. The U.S. should think instead like the underdog, and play a nasty game of maneuver. If we want Turkey to stay in NATO, we have to scare the stuffing out of Erdogan, for example, by helping the Kurds give him a bloody nose.
Cardinal Richelieu explained all of this to me in various ectoplasmic interviews which I have reproduced elsewhere on this page.
For reference, my earlier essays on the emerging “Pax Sinica” in the Middle East are reproduced below.
Asia TimesOctober 28, 2013English-language media completely ignored a noteworthy statement that led Der Spiegel‘s German-language website October 12, a call for China to “take on responsibility as a world power” in the Middle East. Penned by Bernhard Zand, the German news organization’s Beijing correspondent, it is terse and to the point: now that China imports more oil from the Middle East than any other country in the world, it must answer for the region’s security. “America’s interest in the Middle East diminishes day by day” as it heads towards energy self-sufficiency, wrote Zand, adding:
China’s interest in a peaceful Middle East is enormous, by contrast. Beijing is not only the biggest customer of precisely those oil powers who presently are fanning the flames of conflict in Syria; as a VIP customer, Beijing has growing political influence, which it should use openly. The word of the Chinese foreign minister has just as much weight in Tehran and Riyadh as that of his American counterpart.
China’s situation, Zand continues, is rather like Germany’s after reunification: a state whose economic power is growing will eventually be asked what it puts on the table politically. He concludes:
The time when American could be counted on to secure Beijing’s supply lines soon will come to an end – America’s budget deficit will take care of that by itself. Whoever wants to be a world power must take on responsibilities.
I have no idea how China envisions its future role in the Middle East. Americans will learn the intentions of the powers who gradually fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withdrawal from the world “well after the fact, if ever”, as I wrote on September 16 (See US plays Monopoly, Russia plays chess, Asia Times Online). That is why I have retired from foreign policy analysis. It is helpful, though, to take note of what the rest of the world is saying, particularly when not a single English-language source made reference to it. Der Spiegel’s public call for China to assume a leading geopolitical role in the Middle East, though, did not appear out of context.
American commentators have regarded China as a spoiler, the source of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology, Iran’s ballistic missiles, and other alarming instances of proliferation. It is worth considering a radically different view of China’s interests in the lands between the Himalayas and the Mediterranean: no world power has more to lose from instability than does China.
Iran’s nuclear weapons program poses the greatest risk to the region, and China has been viewed as uncooperative in the extreme by Western diplomats trying to tighten the economic screws on Tehran. Chinese companies, moreover, have helped Iran bypass trade sanctions, but at great cost, and with a complex result. The New York Times on September 30 profiled the problems of Iran’s economy under the sanctions, and took note of the country’s dependence on China:
One economist, Mohammad Sadegh Jahansefat, said the government had been taken hostage by countries benefiting from the sanctions – particularly China, which he called the worst business partner Iran had ever had.”China has monopolized our trade – we are subsidizing their goods, which we are forced to import,” he said, adding of its work in the energy industry, “They destroy local production and leave oil and gas projects unfinished so that no one can work with them.” 
China’s capacity to exert pressure on the Iranian regime is considerable. Apart from its interest in avoiding nuclear proliferation in the Persian Gulf, China has a number of points of conflict with Iran, well summarized in an October 17 survey by Zachary Keck in The Diplomat.  The one that should keep Tehran on its toes is the Islamic Republic’s border with Pakistan. Iran announced October 26 that it had hanged 16 alleged Sunni rebels in Baluchistan province on the Pakistani border, the latest in a long series of violent incidents.
“With a population of 170 million, Pakistan has 20 million men of military age, as many as Iran and Turkey combined; by 2035 it will have half again as many,” I observed in 2009 (see Hedgehogs and flamingos in Tehran, Asia Times Online, June 16, 2009). It also has nuclear weapons.
Iran sits between two Sunni powers -Turkey and Pakistan – that depend to a great extent on Saudi financing, and that also have excellent relations with China. Turkey’s still-disputed agreement to buy a Chinese air defense system represented a revolution in Chinese-Turkish relations, motivated by a Chinese promise to transfer the whole package of relevant technology to Turkey and to help the Turks to manufacture the systems, a more generous offer than ever Ankara got from the West. Turkey is the logical terminus for the “New Silk Road” of road, rail, pipelines and broadband that China has proposed to build in Central Asia.
China, it might be added, also has excellent relations with Israel, whose premier technical university just was offered a US$130 million grant from Hong Kong magnate Li Ka-shing to fund part of the costs of building a branch in China. Chinese provincial and local governments will contribute another $147 million. The seamless interchange of ideas and personnel between Israel’s military, universities and tech entrepreneurs is a success story in miniature that China hopes to reproduce in scale. As Singapore-based political scientist Michael Raska reports, China’s military modernization envisions the spread of dual-use technologies to private industry.
Without attributing any geopolitical intention to Beijing, the visible facts make clear that China has the capacity to exercise strategic influence in the Middle East, and it has an unambiguous interest in maintaining stability. What China might choose to do, Washington will learn after the fact, if ever. If China wished to influence Iran, for example, it has considerable means to do so, and a great deal else besides.
David P. Goldman is Senior Fellow at the London Center for Policy Research and Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
1. Iran Staggers as Sanctions Hit Economy, New York Times, September 30, 2013.
2. China and Iran: Destined to Clash?, The Diplomat, October 17, 2013.
Source: PJ MEDIA